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Abstract 
The disturbance effect of a depolarizing channel on the security of the quantum key 
distribution of the four state BB84 protocol, with multiple sequential intercept-resend attacks 
of many eavesdroppers, has been studied. The quantum bit error rate and the mutual 
information are computed for an arbitrary number N of eavesdropper. It is found that the 
quantum error rate decreases when increasing the depolarizing parameter p characterizing the 
noise of the channel. For p<0.165, there exist, a special value trp of p below which the 
information is secured, otherwise it is not secured. The value of trp decreases when 
increasing the number of attacks. While, for p  0.165, the information is not secured 
independently of the eavesdropper’s number. Phase diagrams corresponding to the secured-
unsecured information are also established. 
Key words: Quantum key distribution, depolarizing channel, intercept-resend, secured 
information, BB84 protocol.  
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I-Introduction 
The ways of cryptography and quantum data processing crossed when Charles Bennett and 
Gilles Brassard developed the first quantum key distribution (QKD) known as BB84 protocol 
[1]. This protocol allows two participants to exchange a random secret key that can be used 
perfectly for protected communications. Many researchers proposed formal evidences of the 
QKD safety [2-4]. The QKD was already made in practice, and the first prototype was 
developed in 1989 by Bennett et al. [5-7]. In spite of experimental successes, several obstacles 
are important regarding the deployment of this technology out of laboratories [8]. One of 
these factors is the too short distances reached by prototypes; another factor is the 
depolarizing channel and its effect with the presence of eavesdroppers [9]. In a previous work, 
we have analyzed the quantum key distribution with several intercept and resend attacks [10] 
and with several cloning attacks [11]. Recently, the most important problem in practical 
quantum communication is the security of the information under the effect of disturbances or 
quantum noise. In general, the losses of information may be due to several factors namely; the 
attenuation of photon signal due to the weak pulse laser [12], the detector efficiency mismatch 
due to the high  dark counts [13] and the the depolarizing channel noise effect [14]. In the two 
former cases the amount of the losses information, in the absence of eavesdropping, depends 
strongly on the length of the channel. Consequently, one can easily study the dependence of 
the quantum bit error rate and the mutual information as a function of the length of the 
channel, even, in the presence of eavesdroppers. 
However, in the case of Pauli channel [14], the disturbance depends only on the depolarizing 
parameter p, and on the length of the channel [15,16]. Recently, it has been studied in 
different point of view, theoretical and experimental [12,15–18].  
Our aim in this paper is to study the security of the information of the four state BB84 
protocol, under the effect of both channel noise and many eavesdroppers with intercept-resend 
attacks.  
The paper is organized as follows: The protocol is detailed in section II. Section III is devoted 
to results and discussion, while section IV is reserved to conclusion. 
 
II The Protocol  
The BB84 protocol requires two different phases: the first one is through the quantum channel 
physics with one-way, and the second one is through a bidirectional traditional ideal channel 
authenticated [1]. The quantum depolarization channel, we will study in this paper, leaves  
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intact a qubit    with probability (1-p) or applies one of the Pauli matrices i  with 
probability p/3 for each one [14, 15], which is mathematically considered as an operator 
pT defined by: 
  i
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We denote by )/(* AB xxP  the conditional probability that Bob receives a polarized photon 
Bx =0,1 with respect that Alice sends a polarized photon Ax =0,1 under the  channel noise  
effect, namely: 
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Equations (2) and (3) show that, in the absence of eavesdroppers, the information safety 
depends only on the depolarizing channel parameter p with a quantum bit error
3
2p
 . 
In the presence of one eavesdropper within intercept and resend attack, it is difficult to know 
on which side of the channel the Pauli transformations, corresponding to the channel noise, 
take place?  Between Alice and Eve or between Eve and Bob; In the other side, the model we   
used does not allow us to know with certainty whether the photon sent by Alice is disturbed, 
under the channel noise, before or after being intercepted by Eve. Physically, these two 
situations are completely different, and lead to different results. For example, in the case of 
one eavesdropper, the two situations are considered but with different probabilities q and 1-q 
respectively as has been used in reference [9] 
Moreover, in the particular cases, for which the position of Eve is closer to Alice and the 
position of Eve is closer to Bob, we consider q=0 and q=1 respectively. 
In the case of  many sequential intercept-resend attacks, a state sent by Alice can follow the 
ways of transmission according to Fig.1, where the photon losses its polarization, due to the 
channel noise, in one of the space intervals located between   Alice and 1E , or 1E and 
2E , ..., or iE and 1iE ,..., or  nE  and Bob, with the respective 
probabilities 1q , 2q ,.. iq ..., 1nq and 1
1
1



n
i
iq ,  
Alice sends a sequence of photons to Bob by choosing randomly to send 1 or 0. Bob chooses 
randomly to measure the received photon. Between them, there are N independent 
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eavesdroppers iE (i=1,…,N) who intercept sequentially the photon sent by Alice with the 
respective probabilities i . The eavesdropper E1 intercepts the photon sent by Alice with the 
probability 1 , measures its polarization and sent it to E2, then each eavesdropper Ei 
intercepts with the probability i the photon sent by Ei-1, measures its polarization by 
choosing randomly a base, and return them to Ei+1, in the state of polarization that she has 
measured and son on…, until the eavesdropper EN who sent its intercepted photon to Bob. 
However, in the place of the photon that they didn’t measure, they put randomly 0 or 1 in 
their chains of bits. Then, Alice and Bob exchange in a traditional way the bases that they 
used; they remove in their chain of bits those exchanged in different bases. For studying the 
security of information exchanged between two honest parties Alice and Bob, we introduce 
the notion of mutual information. In this case we compute the mutual information between 
Alice and Bob and the mutual information between Alice and every eavesdropper Em .  
III-Results and discussion 
Moreover it is demonstrated that the binary Shannon entropy allows finding the impact on the 
information safety [19-21]. However, the mutual information I(A,B) and I(A,Em) between 
Alice and Bob, and between Alice and the mth eavesdropper Em , are given respectively as 
follows: 
))0/1(()0/1())0/0(()0/0(1),( 22 ABABABAB PLogPPLogPBAI                                              (4) 
))0/1(()0/1())0/0(()0/0(1),( 22 mmmm AEAEAEAEm PLogPPLogPEAI                                    (5) 
Where the conditional probabilities )/( AB xxP and )/( AE xxP m between Alice and Bob and 
Alice and the mth eavesdropper. Before the establishment of the general expressions of these 
probabilities to an arbitrary eavesdropper number N, let us consider the simple case of N=1. 
In this case, Alice sends a polarized photon 0  or 1  to Bob. This photon can undergo a 
depolarization channel according to the eq.(1), between Alice and Eve with a probability 
1 q or between Alice and Eve with a probability 1 -1 q . 
Hence, we denote hereafter by )/(0 ABAB xxP  and )/(
0
AEAE xxP  the conditional probabilities, 
in the case of a perfect channel (p=0), that Bob (Eve) receives a polarized photon 
Bx ( Ex )=0,1 with respect that Alice sends a polarized photon Ax =0,1 namely: 
4
1)0/0(0

ABP       and      
42
1
)0/0(0

AEP . However, using equations (2) and (3), the 
conditional probabilities )/( ABAB xxP  between Alice and Bob, under the effect of both 
channel noise and eavesdropper attacks, are given as follows: 
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The above results can be generalized to the case of an arbitrary number N of eavesdropper as 
follows: 
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With PAB (1/0) =PAB (0/1)=1- PAB (0/0), PAB (1/1)= PAB (0/0), PAEm(1/0) =PAEm (0/1)=1- PAEm 
(0/0) and PAEm (1/1)= PAEm (0/0) 
Finally, the lost information between Alice and Bob is given by: 
                                        HEAIIlost  ),(                                              (10) 
Where, I(A,E) corresponds to the maximum of the mutual information intercepted by  all the 
eavesdroppers,  namely : 
                                              )],([),(
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and     22 )1()1( LogLogH   is the binary Shannon entropy, corresponding to 
the amount of the information lost under the channel noise, in the absence of any external 
eavesdropper attacks. Hence, the error probability errP  is given by [21,22]: 
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The quantum error QBER, due to both channel noise and external attacks, is the value of the 
error probability errP  for which [23-25]  
                                                   HEAIBAI  ),(),(                                           (13) 
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For BERerr QP  ,   ),(),( BAIHEAI   , then the information is secured, while it is not secured 
for BERerr QP   for which   ),(),( BAIHEAI           
Equation (8) shows that the amount of the information received by Bob is independent of the 
stochastic parameter q governing on which region in the channel the depolarization of the 
photon occurs. While equation (9) shows, that the amount of the intercepted information by 
any eavesdropper Em depends strongly on the regions located between Alice and Em , where 
the photon can loss its polarization with  different  probabilities q1, q2 ,…, qm . Hence, the 
mutual information are computed numerically for N=1, 2 and 3, where the eavesdropper 
attack probabilities i are independent. For N=1, the behavior of the quantum bit error 
QBER as a function of the depolarizing parameter p is shown in Fig.2 a. It is clear that the 
quantum error decreases when increasing p and depends also on the coefficient q1=q which 
means the dependency of the amount of the intercepted information by Eve on his position in 
the channel, i.e, the intercepted information depends on which the depolarization of the 
photon occurs between Alice and Eve or between Eve and Bob (Fig.2b). It is clear that the 
lost information increases when decreasing q, which means, in other word, that the amount of 
information intercepted by Eve becomes important, when the depolarization of the photon 
occurs between Eve and bob and not between Alice and Eve.  Beside the lost information 
increases when increasing the depolarizing parameter p, passes through a maximum and 
decreases for sufficiently large value of p.  Phase diagram showing the region in 
the ),( p plane where the information is secured, is given in Fig.3. It is found that, for a 
fixed value of the attack probability , there exist a special value of p=ptr , at which the 
secured-unsecured transition occurs. Hence, for p<ptr ,  the amount of the lost information is 
less than that received by Bob, which means that the information is secured. While for p>ptr , 
the information is not secured. To better understand the influence of sequential attacks, by 
three eavesdroppers, on the security of the information, we have established numerically, the 
phase diagram in the space parameter ),,( 321  showing the transition between 
secured-unsecured information for qi=1/4,
 
p=0.05 (Fig.4a) and p=0.1 (Fig.4b). It is clear that 
the transition surface between secured and secured information depends strongly on the 
values of p and the secured area decreases when increasing the p. 
Now we investigate the security phase diagram (Fig.5) and the behavior of the quantum bit 
error (Fig.6) in the particular case corresponding to an arbitrary number of eavesdroppers 
intercepting the photon with identical probabilities  i , but without sharing the results of 
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their measures. Phase diagram established in Fig.5 shows that the secured area decreases 
when increasing the number of eavesdropper since the amount of intercepted information 
increases with N. On the other hand, it is clear from Fig.6 that the quantum error depends 
strongly on the number of eavesdropper for small depolarizing parameter values, while this 
dependence is weak for sufficiently large values of p, especially near p=0.165. 
IV-Conclusion:                                                                                                                                       
We have studied the effect of both channel noise and many sequential intercept-resend attacks 
on the security of information in the BB84 protocol. We have shown that the quantum error 
decreases when increasing the number of sequential attacks and/or the depolarizing 
parameter.  For a fixed depolarizing parameter p, the security of information becomes weak 
when increasing the number of eavesdropper, which leads to a secured-unsecured transition at 
a special number of attacks. This number decreases when increasing p.  
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Figure Captions 
Fig.1: Scheme of the quantum channel with many sequential attacks  
Fig. 2: The behaviour of   the quantum bit error (a) and the lost information (b) as a function 
of the depolarizing parameter p   for 1N and several values of q. 
Fig. 3: Phase diagram in the ),( p  plane showing the transition between secured and 
unsecured information for 1N and 2/11 q
 
Fig. 4:  Phase diagram in the space parameter ),,( 321  showing the transition 
between secured and unsecured information for 3N  and 
4/14321  qqqq  with (a) p=0.05 and (b) p=0.1  
Fig. 5: Phase diagram in the ( p , ) plane showing the secured-unsecured transition in the 
case of  i  (i=1,…, N ) and )1/(1  Nqq i and different values of N. 
Fig.6: The behaviour of the quantum bit error as a function of the depolarizing parameter p  
for  i  (i=1,…, N ) and )1/(1  Nqq i and several values of N 
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